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ABSTRACT
The past few years have brought: an incre •;? *
tific approach to decision-making. Current Liters sratly concern!
itself with analytical theories..
This paper investigates an application of the statistical decision
process to the problem of ASW tactical decisions. The Bayesian decision
process is utilized.
The paper analyzes the basic ASW decision problem with emphasis on
the uncertainty aspect of a possible submarine contact. A mechanism is
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A Large amount of literature is presently lilal >ry
of decision-making, and investigation of the subject continues. Coo tem-
porary interest in the analysis of the dec is ion-making process is
\
ally attributed to the published work of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Q.2J
The majority of the literature concerns itself with analytical theories
of the process. A few writers have attempted to apply the theory to
specific real world decision problems. [6,7]
One of the purposes of postgraduate education at the U. Sc Naval
Postgraduate School is to provide the student with sufficient scientific
and technical background to permit him to fill the middle -ground between
the scientist and the naval officer --to provide the capability of in-
terpreting present technical theory and development, with an eye toward
its application to naval warfare. This paper is an exercise in such
interpretation. It is an investigation of the current literature on the
decision-making process with a specific application to the decision prob-
lems of an anti-submarine warfare commander.
This paper attempts to analyze the ASW commander
'
a tactical deci-
sion problems. The objective of the commander l's analysis is to select a
particular course of action, from among the available courses of action,
that is consistent with the coturaander's desire for a particular result.
The heart of the problem is the uncertainty associated with a "pos-
sible submarine contact"; an indication from one or more detection sensors
that a submarine is present. Is it a submarine or isn't it?
This uncertainty is currently being evaluated by the commander and
his staff on the basis of experience and a particular for the ASW
1

tactical: situation. The purpose of the analys is t pro-
; Ku-nwlism for taking Into account the c tmman<d t i preferen @a md
the degree of contact uncertainty, rather than ;; , "• deci-=
s ion-maker's unaided "feel" for the problero.
An effort has been made to avoid the extreme technical terminology
and mathematical theory prevalent in much of the i «vnd theoreti-
cal expositions of the subject. An attempt is made to c mfine the dis-
cussion of theory to relevant areas of interest to the military reader.
Although an ASW Hunter-Killer Group situation is used as an illustrative
vehicle in investigating the decision problem 3 the analysis is equally
applicable to maritime patrol aircraft and surface escort operations.
This paper is an analysis of the basic decision problem with empha-
sis on the uncertainty aspect of a possible submarine contact. A mecha-
nism is developed to formally connect the general aspects of the problem.
Bayesian decision approach is utilized.

2. Fa< Influencing th<
.aneration of a possible
warfare operations will pose various decision require
commander. Among the decisions to be made at- ther
cute the contact, whether or not to provide addit
whether or not to expend weapons,
Inherent in the criteria for these decisions t% rhe weight i
decision-maker places en the consequences of 1} classifying a non-sub-
marine contact as submarine, 2) classifying a submarine contact as non-
submarine, 3) classifying a non- submarine contact as and
4) classifying a submarine contact as submarine. The consequences of
each alternative classification will vary with the particular tactical
situation. For instance, classifying a valid submarine ta :t in-
submarine when defending a continent against missile launchin j
would be much more critical than making the same claa Lcation in a
force-support situation with the contact fifteen miles astern a fast
moving carrier task force.
Inputs for these decisions include forces and w< Le,
the number of contacts currently being prosecuted v the prospects of
additional valid contacts.
The solutions to these decision problems are typically em
the "feel" that a coasro.tnder and his staff have for the mti-submarii
warfare problem. This "feel" is primarily the result of past experience,
The increasing distance in time since World War II, coupled with tl
increased complexity and sophistication of airborne, surface, and sub-
surface ASW equipments dictates that this experi luring

peacetime training exercises.
The inborn artificialities of. exercise situations tend to obscure
many of the crucial inputs that must necessarily b^ In a war-
time situation. As an example, training exercises span a specified time
period, typically 72 to 96 hours. The number of opposing submarines is
generally known. Weapons are simulated by sound charges that can be
carried in large numbers. These artificialities have, in past exercises s
led to decisions to commit forces at a rate that would make them ineffec-
tive after 96 hours of operation. The exercise tactic of attacking
every contact with a simulated weapon is not compatible with the number
of actual weapons available, nor with the load capability of the delivery
vehicle. In addition, the generation of simultaneous contacts in excess
of the number of target submarines known to be assigned to the exercise,
results in some contacts being suspect on a purely numerical basis.
These factors bias tactical decisions and would not be present during
wartime operations.
The effects of these exercise artificialities can be reduced or
eliminated by realistic exercise limitations. However, too stringent
limitations as to assignment of forces and expenditure of simulated
weapons reduces the training and experience available to individual
units participating in the limited exercise periods.
The critical parameter in the ASW commander "s decision problems is
the uncertainty associated with a given contact. Statistical data from
exercises where valid reconstruction has been possible points up the
degree of uncertainty associated with every contact. The effect of this
uncertainty during exercise situations is somewhat obscured during the

exercise by the desire to worl dividual AS'W uni
contact area. This is a spurious input fad »i the re« Eperienc*
and "feel" of the decision maker.
The objective of any analysis of the ASW commander ' s decision prob-
lem is to identify a course of action that is Logically consistent with
the degree of contact uncertainty and the consequences associated with
each available course of action, The analysis can reasonably be divided
into two areas for discussion. The first area is that of contact uncer-
tainty. The second area considers the consequences of each course of
action.
Contact uncertainty, in the parlance of the statistician, is uncer-
tainty due to the state of nature. A given contact is either a
or it is not. Here the two states of nature are submarine, or non-sub°
mar ine
.
The consequences of various courses of action can be analyzed by
subjectively associating a value judgement or utility with each action,
A given action will produce a desirability of result for each possible
state of nature, This is more nearly a problems in prediction.

3. An Illustrative ASW Contact Situation.
following hypothetical ASW conta< - be .'
i ehicle to discuss pertinent aspects of the decisi a re
Suppose that an ASW Hunter-Killer Task Group t : ra-
tile convoy during its raid-ocean transit. The convoy is foil ass
established convoy route, it is proceeding with a ten knot $
advance. The ASW group has the responsibility of provide bc-
tion for the convoy for a distance of L,500 miles -« a si sit
period.
The hunter-killer group is composed of an ASW aircraft carrier with
a deck loading of fixed-wing search aircraft (3-2), and s •-:
helicopters (SH-3). The carrier is escorted by seven destroyers,
The force is steaming in a typical disposition,, Two S-2
aircraft and four helicopters are maintained in & "ready" stati on the
carrier.
An S-2 search aircraft reports a disappearing radar eontaci nd
investigates the area with "Julie". A "Julie" echo £«lirfi«tijn is
obtained. Two S-2 aircraft and four helicopters are launched from th
carrier to assist in prosecuting the contact. Two destroyers in the
vicinity of the contact are also sent to the contact area. One helio
ter gains sonar contact; another helicopter classifies, the contact as
non- submarine. One of the alerted S-2 aircraft obtains a possible
fix; the other S-2 aircraft doss not attempt Localization. One
gains sonar contact; the other destroyer classifies the contact as non-
submarine.
One of the S-2 aircraft drops a weapon on the cent ised upon

ilization information. Weapon detonation is \ -2
ilrcraft, two he lie >pters and lei fere Ira the c ml net > re s
to conduct close search and localization until the area of contact Is
well astern oi the cwnvoy.
During the time interval required for the convoy to clear the
nal area of contact, relief aircraft and helicopters are launched from
the carrier to replace those previously on station in the contact area.
While this contact is being actively prosecuted three additional conta
incidents are generated by other units of the £. . •.• farce.
This hypothetical contact situation provides a typical scenario of
actions and interactions of units within this ASW force. Imbedded
within this contact situation are numerous tactical decision problems.
The initial report of a disappearing radar contact fey the search
aircraft was the result of a specific decision, rhe plane commander of
the search aircraft decided that sufficient Information was available I
classify a particular sensor indication as a possible submarine.
The ASW group co.iroander felt that the initial indication plus the
confirming Julie echo was sufficient justification for investigation by
additional forces. The corcaaander * s estimate >"t: the validity of the co
tact, combined with an appreciation of the current t net Leal situation,
dictated the nucuber and type of additional units to be sent to the con-
tact area.
The decision to attack the contact with a weapon was based on the
aircraft commander's (or the contact area commander *s) estimate »f tti
validity of the contact just prior to weapon release.
The decision to maintain forces in the contact LI tl

convoy was clear of the area was a result of the ASW c fi sti-
pulate of the threat, weighted by a subjective pi Lity sure t
the contact was in fact submarine*
This is a somewhat abbreviated description
analysis that would take place in this typical situation. Some of the
actions and decisions cited are probably a result of standard operating
procedures and policies rather than specific decisions resulting from
conscious analysis at discrete periods in the tactic: 1 sequence. For
instance, general guidelines are usually promulgated to indicate wfc
combinations of sensor response will make an attack profitable.
Sonar has proven to be one of the best localization and classifica-
tion equipments available. Development of the sonar-dipping helicopter
provides the capability of putting sonar equipment into the contact area
at an accelerated rate. The sonar equipment in a helicopter is gener-
ally less effective than destroyer sonar, but the helicopter arrives at
the contact area much sooner than the destroyer. This development tends
to ditate che types and numbers of units that the r'.. - .
order wo a contact area after sufficient weight is given to the degree
of contact uncertainty and the current tactical situation.
Every decision made during a contact incident is ultimately the
responsibility of the ASW commander. Some decisions are made by unit
commanders within certain limitations previously specified by the ASW
commander. The decision to launch a weapon is generally included in
this area. For completeness,, these decisions might be earned pre-planne*




The major decisions, the ones which effect] control the oves 11
actions of the force, are made at discrete inl J com-
mander. These are the decisions of primary Interest here t The main
emphasis will be upon the commander's decision to prosecute fully a
given contact, or to "drop" it.
There is one aspect of this particular decision problem that appears
unique. After a decision has been tfsade to disregard a particular contact
it is often possible to hedge the decision* In the Illustrative situa-
tion just cited, if the commander had decided to drop the contacts, the
decision might have been hedged by assigning,, say, two aircraft to remaifs
in the area until the initial contact location no longer posed a threat
to the convoy.

4, The Statistical Decision Process,
An ASW commander faced with a contact decxw :>ti..-o p i ticu-
lar information available to him. He is aware oj !i I I actical
situation. He has been apprised of the technical aspects of the ASW
equipment within his force, and the local environmental conditions,,
The commander can solve the decision problem using an informal deci-
sion method. On the basis of known facts 3 his experience, judgement and
intuitive feel, he can decide to drop the contact,, or supply additional
forces to fully prosecute the contact.
The other alternative is to systematically analyze each factor in
the decision problem and apply relevant statistical decision rules to
aid in the decision.
Most aspects of these two decision methods are quite similar. The
statistical decision process is but a formal method of considering facts,
assumptions, and objectives that bear on decisions under uncertainty.
The military reader will be aware of the step by step formalism in
the commander's "Estimate of the Situation" set forth in the publication
Joint Action Armed Forces. The major steps in the estimate are I)
Mission and its analysis ; 2) Situation and courses of action ; 3) Analy-
sis of opposing courses of action; A) Comparison of own courses of action^
and 5) the Decision.
Steps in the statistical decision process follow closely this mili-
tary planning outline. The emphasis in the statistical decision method
is on the concept of "expected value" associated with a given action.,
It will be well to discuss first the basic concepts of the decision




Consider an urn containing 85 white balls.
balls is tossed at the mouth of the urn. You are then jffes
lowing proposition. An individual will reach into the urn m dl *il
a single ball. Before the ball is withdrawn! you are to guess whetfc i
the ball will be black or white. If you specify a black hall and a
black ball is drawn you and the individual drawing the ball will win •
total of $113; but if the ball is white you will both lose a total of
$20, If you specify a white ball and a black ball is drawn' yout com-
bined loss will be $255," but if the ball is white you gain a total
$45.







Eb - Draw a
black ball. - $255 $113
Ew
- Draw a
white ball. $45 - $20
When the black bails were tossed at the mouth of the urn s you esti-
mate that 15 of the black balls dropped into the urn.
Your analysis of the situation might proceed in the following i
ner. From the information available and your observation of the toss of
the handful of black balls, you feel that the urn now contains 100 balls;
85 white and 15 black. This would translate into probabilities of 0« IS
for drawing a black ball and 0.85 for drawing a white ball.
With an intuitive approach you might feel that your chances for
gain would be better if you specified a white ball,, (I.e. , took action
11

Aw ). The "odds'" appear to be in favor of a white sing drawn..
Using the expected value approach',, howevei
.












Eb - Draw a
black ball. 0.13
- $255 $113





The fact that the event E has a relatively high probability of
occurring weighs heavily in its favor. But event Ew , drawing a black
ball, has some weight no matter how small. If the result® of ea
action are weighed with respect to the proposed payoff and the pro.
bility of occurrence for each event, a "weighted average payoff", or
expected payoff can be determined.
For action A^ the expected payoff is;
(0.15)(- $255) + (0.85){$45) s $ 00
For action Aj> the expected payoff is*
(0.15)($113) -l- (0.85K- $20) z $ yj
Using the statistical decision approach, the decision rule for maxi-
mizing gain (or minimizing loss) is to take the action having the nig
expected return. In this example, either action could be specified with
the same average return, zero dollars.
This decision rule is relative. Had the expected returns been
equal to one cent and zero, deciding in favor of th , sctiuyni with a one
12

cent expected value would be setaewhat marginal, lhe question is,
much "higher" should one's expected return be Co justify d Its
favor. This question must be considered within the context of I ar-
ticular decision problem,
As a further illustration, suppose the same game of chance is pro-
posed. But in addition, the individual drawing the ball from the urn Is
offered an opportunity to conduct a series of experiments. He is allowed
to draw a ball from the urn, note its color, and then replace it. The
experiment to be conducted a maximum of 100 times.. You are also told
that there is a minute difference in the surface texture of the white
and black balls. In all other respects, save the color and texture, the
balls are identical. When the experiments are completed a color is to be
specified and a single ball is to be drawn, as before.
The payoff matrix will be the same as for the first example. The
opportunity to conduct the experiments will cost S5, regardless of the
outcome of the final gamble. This latter aspect is in accord with the
somewhat realistic observation that information generally commands a
price.
The individual drawing the balls from the urn is allowed to test
the texture of one black and one white ball prior to conducting the pre-
liminary sampling.
Because of the higher payoff for specifying a black ball and then
drawing a black ball, the individual drawing the ball would like to
select a black ball frora the urn on the payoff draw. During the s
pling experiment he attempts to select a black ball each tlnae.
Suppose that in conducting the experiments 25 of the 103 balls drawn
13

are biack : That is, in attempting -i a bl :he
texture, the individual drawing th< il I of
t ime
This problem is somewhat less amenable to an intuitive decision due
to che Added complications of the experiments and the cost of experi-
menting.
For the statistical decision process, use is made ^f the following
equation, due to Bayes, to weigh the information available.





where P(E,|S) denotes the conditional or relative
probability that event E* will occur, given the hypothesis that S is
known to have occurred.,
An explicit form of equation (I), more pertinent r i tlh sample
under discussion is;
P(Sb|Eb)P(Eb )
1 bl b ' " P<S b |Eb ) P(Sb )+- PCSJjE^) ¥(EJ
U!'
In the example under discussion Eb And E-. are the events "'draw a
black ball" and "draw a white ball". The symbols Sb and Sw denote the
hypothesis that the individual drawing the ball "says" that he is draw-
ing or attempting to draw a black or a white ball.
P(Eb ) in equation (2) is the "a priori" pro ability of drawing a
black ball. This is sometimes referred to as the actual or original
probability. P(Eb | S b ) is the "a posteriori" probability of drawing a
black ball; often called the new or gained proba Lity. rhe & posteriori
probability is the new probability of drawirj} - I :k ball when th
L4

information on the capability of the it b lack ball I
considered.
Using equation (2) to compete to i con ...'—.>.
black bail:
(0.25H0.15)
*(Sb |SI l b (0,25) (0.15) + (0,75) (0.85)
s 0.056
Considering the original estimate of the numt er of black and white
balls in the urn, and the information gained from conducting the expert-
raents the probability of drawing a black ball is now "3.056. The proba-
bility of drawing a white ball, under these conditions, 1& oce minui thli







Eb 0.056 -$260 $108
*w
0.944 $40 - $25
Expected v *lue; $23*14 -$17.55
The individual payoffs reflect the five dollar information cost.
Using the statistical decision rule to choose the action with the
higher expected payoff, action A*,, specify a white ball, is indicated.
It should be noted that the individua' "s attempt to draw a blick
ball produced a counter-effect on the decision. Even though he was
attempting to draw a black ball, the experiments indicated that there
was a positive conditional probability of 0.75 that he would draw a
white bail. To disregard this information, with the idea that the
15

individual was not very ade ling ! ;; ilia the
problem to the i ; '
.
If after reviewing the i ml ©f the
- ; j j cided to try to dx , rhite ball ©n the final ^amhl t >ri-
cal information gained from the experiments would I \
experimental conditions and the conditions under which the final di
would hive beam conducted would not have been the same.
HH the experiments result ted in a sample of bo black balls £
draws the expected payoffs would have been - $55 for action A and B„25
for action A^« In this case action Aj^s specify i black ball u
been indicated.
These two examples have introduced two interpretations of proba-
bility and the concept of expected value.
Classically, probabilities have besn interpreted in the relative
frequency sense. For instance, the probability of observing "heads" on
the toss of an average coin is 0.5. rhis means that if the coin is
tossed ever and over again, the number of heads observed will tend to
equal the number of tails observed, it does not mean that if the coin
is tossed ten tinses that five heads will be o>1 3 i ed.
Using a decision rule favoring the higher expected value, in this
sense of a "long-run average"', would be valid for events that are
to be repeated over and s > sr igaln, '© jse the iverage
on the relative frequency interpretation of probability to specify the
outcosae of a single toss of the coin would have •- i wn aninj
Personal or subjective probabilities are r. . assertions of i lative
frequencies. They ire cea • in Individ
16

feeling as to the probable outcome of a particular eve , Subjective
probabilities are often the sawie as relative freq probabilities, as
is generally the case for the toss of a coin. This is ass indication
that the only information available is the historical results gained
from tossing average coins. But if additional information were avail"
able regarding a particular coin, that it was bene, or that it was
peculiarly weighted, then relative frequency would be only o>ne factor
to consider in specifying a personal probability for the toss of this
particular coin.
Using expected value as a guide to decision on the basis of personal
probabilities is not dependent on the lomg-ru-i average smd the repetition




5. The Statistical Decision Process Applied te le ,
The statistical decision concepts of the pi , s sections can be
applied to the anti-submarine warfare contact situation. Pertinent
factors in the hypothetical contact situation set forth in Section 3
can be analyzed in a manner similar to that used in the ball and urn
example.
Somewhat realistically, it will be assumed that the ASW commander
has access to Che following information:
a. Intelligence estimates indicate that f rotas 1 to L5 of the enemy's
fleet of submarines are probably assigned to the L 9 500 mile segment of
the convoy route under discussion.
b. Records of previous exercises and convoy operations show that
each airborne search unit will generate an average of 15 contact incidents
for each 10,000 square males searched.
c. There is a statistical measure of uncertainty for initial detec-
tion and contact confirmation incidents that can be associated with each
ASW vehicle/sensor type, The uncertainty measures are in the form of
relative frequency probabilities obtained from reconstructed ASW exer<=
C1S65
»
Faced with a typical contact decision problem, the ASW c «mander
must choose between two possible courses of action:
A^ - "Drop the contact"; no further attempt is made to localise or
attack the contact,
A - "Prosecute the contact"; provide additional! forces to attempt
localization and kill.
There are a large number of possible actions available to th<
commander » most of which are not relevant to the pi h id.
IS

Although there are more than tw sasibl .>]
available, the present discussion will be i actions
stated above.
In terms of the previous discussion of the statistical decision
process, there are two possible events or outcomes i two possible "states
of nature".
E„ - The contact is not a submarine,
n
Es
- The contact _is a submarine.
The third factor needed to construct the payoff matrix is the pay=
offs themselves. Monetary payoffs of the kind used in the ball and u
example are not entirely meaningful here, ihe concept of utility or
utility-value is broader and can include the monetary aspect.
The ASW commander makes a value judgement as to the relative utility
of taking a particular action under the assumption Chat the contact is
or is not a submarine. These value judgements are transformed into nu-
merical values which are intended to describe the commander °s subjective
ideas as to the relative value of specific outcomes. Inherent in this
concept of utility-value is the commander ,J s estimate of the consequences
of disregarding a contact that is in fact a submarine s of prosecuting a
contact that is not a submarine, etc. These utility- values are not con-
stant, they can and will change with changes in the tactical situation
and the mission of the ASW force.
For the hypothetical contact situation previously cited , the numbers






En - Contact is
not a subraa rine ,
50 -15
Es - Contact is
a submarine.
-250 LI !
The utility values in the payoff matrix are relative with respect
to one another. The numbers could all be made positive by adding 25© te
each one, and their relative ordering would remain unchanged. In addi-
tion, such an adjustment would not affect the final indie at ion in *
statistical decision process. The use of positive and negative values
is to provide a sense of physical gain or loss.
The final factor to be considered is the degree of contact uncer-
tainty. For this example suppose that the following relative frequency

























True State of Nature Suboaffirine Non- Submarine
Vehicle /Sensor j Nosa-" % Non- %
Classification Sub. Sub. Corr„ Sub, Sub, Corr.
S = 2
Julie 24 56 30 80 50 40
• • • • • • *
o . o a « .
SH-3
Sonar 30 A 5 40 56 24 70
„ a , ,
DD
Sonar 42 28 60 60 15 sa
• . o • • • -
° o ' " *
The above data are hypothetical , developed for illustrative purposes
only. The data are categorised by initial detection and contact confirm
atioa to provide for the two modes of crew operation, In a confirmation
situation the sensor operator , and in fact the entire crew, is in an
"alerted" condition,
These statistics provide the conditional probabilities referred to
in the urn problem. For instance t the helicopter sonar confirmation
data provide the conditional probability P(HSj E
s ), the probability
that the helicopter sonar detection system will indicate "submarine"
when a submarine is actually present. The data give this particular
probability as 0.40.
If Bayes 11 rule is to be used a final statistic, not obtainable from
the above data, is required, ks in the urn problem, the a priori or
initial probability must be known or approximated. Equate the initial
number of black and white balls in the urn to the number of "submarines"
21

submarines" in the >articu] ir E interest. re-
'
, reusabilities are F( . the ratio of th isabei
i • nt t© the total number of submarines plus non~submarines present
|
)s the ratio) of the number of non* submarines present to the sa
total a>f submarines plus non-submarines. The non-* submarines are the
• asnon and objects in the ocean that produce submarine -like indica-
tions in search sinsars.
In the case of airborne systems 9 suppose that each aircraft gener-
ates an average of 15 contact incidents for each 10,000 square miles of
search,, irrespective of the density of actual submarines. This can be
used as an approximation to the total number of submarine and non- sub-
marine contacts in each 10 s 000 square miles of search area, for each
aircraft.
»r this example , assuming i search area 30 miles on either side of
the convoy track, search operations will cover 150,000 square miles.
This translates into approximately 223 non=subraartne and submarine con-
tacts in the search area available to each search aircraft.
The intelligence information assumed in this example places 7 t:u 1 r-
enem j marines in the same 150,000 square miles of ocean. Suppose
that past exercise operations indicate that aircraft detection systems
will detect 65 percent of the actual number of submarines in the exer-
cist search area. Using this approximation and the maximum number >
enemy submarines expected to be in the search area, the number of sub-
marines in the total population of airborne contact incidents is approxi-
mated at 9.7.
This line of reasoning produces the following a priori probabilities
n

for aircraft search systems,
P(Ea ) ^ 0,043 P(E„) s 0,957
The ASW commander is aware of the source and sample size of the
statistical information regarding initial detection and contact confirma-
tion. In this example suppose that the majority of exercises from which
these data were obtained were conducted in areas of "good" sonar condi-
tions and sea states of 2 to 3 Current sonar conditions are "good" and
the sea state is to I. This information is used to modify the relative
frequency probabilities provided by the data.
For instance, the conditional probability for initial S-2/radar de-
tection is indicated as P(SS |ES ) s 0.20 . The commander assigns a sub-
jective probability of 0.25 to this detection, based primarily on the
current reduced sea state. The others are modified in a similar manner,
where applicable. To summarize the relevant probabilities
;
The a priori probabilities;
P (Submarine) * P(ES ) * 0.043



































Destroyer sonar-; P(DSS | Es ) = 0.60
(contact)
P(DS S | En) 0.20
Destroyer sonar; P(DSn | Es ) = 0.40
(no contact)
P(DSn | En ) = 0.80
The a posteriori probability to be determined in this example is
the probability that the contact is a submarine given the conditions
that the S-2 radar classified the contact as submarine, S-2 Julie classi-
fied it as a submarine; one helicopter classified it as a submarine; one
helicopter classified the contact as non-submarine; one destroyer gained
sonar contact; and one destroyer classified it as non- submarine. In
symbols, the desired probability is P(^|0S s DSn RSn HS S SJ S SRS ).
If the initial detection and subsequent confirmations are consid-
ered step by step, one action at a time, the a posteriori probability
determined by one action becomes the a priori probability for the next
action to be considered.
For the initial radar detection, using Bayes 1 formula,
P(E |SR ) - P(SRs|Es ) P(ES )
P(SRS |ES ) P(ES )+ P(SRs |En ) P(EnT
'
The a posteriori probability that the contact is a submarine, using the
information gained from the initial detection, is
(0. 25) (0.043)
P(E S |SR S ) = (0.25)(0.043)-h (0.75X0.957) s
°° 015 -
Next, the information available from the S-2 Julie confirmation is
considered. The a posteriori probability for the initial detection,











P(SJ S |ES ) P<Es ) t -h P(SJs |En ) P(Z Xi ) {
So that,
P(SS |SJS SR S ) z (Q.3Q)(0.015)(0.30)(0. 15) + (0.60)(0.985)
- 0.0075
Continuing with each successive information factor, we have
P(SS |HS S SJS SRS ) = 0.0099,
P(Ss |HSn HS S SJS SR S ) : 0.0085,
P(Es {DSn HSn HS S SJS SRS ) r 0.0043.,
P(ES |DSS DSn HSn HSS SJS SRg ) z 0,013,
The final a posteriori probability that the contact is a submarine
is 0,013. The probability that the contact is not a submarine is one
minus this number, or 0.987. Putting these values into the payoff matrix
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-13.4
The decision rule which favors the action with the higher expected
payoff would indicate the selection of action An , drop the contact. An
additional criterion is provided when the expected values are considered
within a relative frame of reference.
If each of the vehicle/sensors had classified the contact as "sub-
marine", the final a posteriori probabilities would have been 0.109 for
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event Es and 0.891 for event E , The expected values would have been
-17.3 for action P^ and -1.4 for action A
s
.
If each classification attempt had resulted in a "non- submarine'
classification, the probabilities would have been 0.005 for event E
s
0.995 for event E_. The associated expected values for these probabili-
ties are 48.5 for action A^ and -14.5 for action A_.
Intuitively, these two results appear to nark the extreme value;;
that could be expected from this particular interaction. However, a
wider range of values could occur* This situation is similar to the
discussed in the urn problem, where it was profitable to "bet against
the individual selecting the ball."
For the submarine contact situation^one limiting set of valuer, wo
occur if the S-2/Julie sensor classified the contact as non-submarine and
the other units classified it as a submarine. This would result in prob-
abilities of 0.30 for event Es and 0.70 for event E . The expected
values would then be -40 for action P^ and 22.5 for action A
s
.
The other limit would by defined for a S-2/Julie classification of
submarine, with all other units classifying the contact as non-submarine.
The probabilities would then be 0.0014 for event Ss and 0.9986 for event
E , with expected values of 49.6 for action A and -49.6 for action As .
Comparison of the calculated expected values with the extreme values
which could be anticipated can best be done by referring to the absolute
differences in expected values.. This difference in expected values can
be considered as a measure of "risk" when referred to the action with the
lower expected value.
For the calculated values of 46.1 and -13,4 this absolute difference
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is 59.5 when referred to action %. In this case, to select action As
instead of ^ the decision-maker is risking an amount 59.5. A zero risk
value would occur when the expected values for each action were zero.
The decision-maker would then be indifferent as to the choice of a par-
ticular action.
Calculating the risk values for the limiting conditions, we have
99.2 -t Maximum value
(63,0)
59.5
(All vehicle/sensors classify contact as non-submarine
Actual classification information from vehicle/sensors
0.0 -- Point of indifference
(-15.9)-- (All vehicle/sensors classify contact as submarine)
-62.5 -L Minimum value
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lis method of comparing expected values provides a measure of
relative magnitudes. It also permits comparisons with other contact
incidents.
Where physical considerations Unit the number of contacts that
can be prosecuted simultaneously , a comparison of risk values will indi
cate the contacts which can be prosecuted most profitably.
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6 t Sensitivity Analysis.
The a posteriori probabilities determined in the previous analysis
were calculated to the third and sometimes the fourth significant figure.
It will be said that it is unrealistic to generate numbers which infer
four place accuracy when the input probabilities are subjectively deter-
mined. But it can be argued that the input probabilities can be made as
accurate as one desires them to be. If a probability of 0.90 is subjec-
tively assigned for the occurrence of a particular event, an extension
of this same type of subjective evaluation will permit one to opinionize
a probability of 0.9032 with similar subjectivity. Probability in this
sense is but ordered opinion, and the ordering can be as definitive as
is required.
In this particular application rounding-off probabilities to the
first decimal place would fatally degrade the sensitivity of the indi-
vidual classification inputs. There appears to be sufficient sensitivity
in this type of analysis when input probabilities of two or three signif-
icant figures are used.
It will be noted that the sample size is quite small for initial
contact and confirmation data. A data base of this size generally is
not considered sufficient to provide statistical validity. This factor
must be weighed by the decision-maker in making the final comparison of
risk-values. A change in one of the recorded incidents creates a size-
able change in the conditional probabilities.
In the "submarine" incidents for DD sonar confirmation, the total
sample size is 70 -- 42 correct classifications and 28 incorrect clas-
sifications. These figures provide a probability P(DSS | Es ) * 0.60.
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A change in one incident, StUy to 43 correct and 27 incorrect classifica-
tions, would change this probability to 0.615.
The hypothetical sample sixes used in this illustrative problem are
intended to emphasize the relatively limited data base chat is currently
available. This shortcoming can be corrected.
Bayes" theorem of conditional probability is far from being a new
idea in statistics. However, opposition to its use has been widespread.
This reluctance has stemmed from the difficulty of obtaining the required
a priori probabilities. With the historic or relative frequency view of
probability, the prior probabilities are required to be prohibitively
accurate. Introduction of subjective probability, the view that proba-
bilities are a measure of one's personal opinion, has effectively removed
this obstacle -- provided that this definition for the measurement of
uncertainty is accepted.
This is not to say that these probabilities are arbitrary. The a
priori probability P(ES ) is really a conditional probability. It is the
probability of the contact being submarine, based on all of the avail-
able information about enemy submarines in tha area, prior to the time
the initial detection is made.
A major advantage in using Bayes' theorem is that two logical but
different a priori probabilities will converge toward the same a poste-
riori probability with successive applications of Bayes' formula. The
a priori information becomes overwhelmed by the successive weighing of
additional information.
Suppose that the initial probabilities in the submarine example had
been 0.20 for the contact being a submarine and 0.80 for the probability
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of a non-submarine. These probabilities in the illustrative analysis
were 0.043 and 0,957, With this set of different prior probabilities
the final a posteriori pi i Llity would have been 0.065 for the contact
being a submarine. This would have produced a risk value of 37.8. The
minimum and maximum risk then would have been -232.5 and 61.9.
Experienced ASW commanders would not vary radically in determining
the values for initial probabilities. In the highly unlikely circum-
stance that the a priori probabilities were taken as 0.50 and 0.50, an
extreme limit would be reached. This would be the condition of equally
likely occurrence. This situation is sometimes referred to as the condi-
tion of equal distribution of ignorance, or the condition of insufficient
reason. Equally likely events are those in which, after exhaustive ex-
amination of the available information influencing the event, one is led
to assume that no particular event will occur in preference to the other.
The following graph compares the two conditions just discussed and




























Line A is the resulting risk-values for the original analysis with
a priori probabilities of 0.043 and 0.957. Prior probabilities of 0.2(5
and 0.80 determined the results for B. The equally likely case is
represented by C. The last line, D, is a scale for the intervals of
risk-values involved. The numbers in boxes are those values determiner
by the initial detection and subsequent confirmations. The extreme
values for each case represent the maximum and minimis* values that could
have been obtained for the particular vehicle /sensors involved in the
illustrative incident.
It will be noted that the boxed value is in the upper one- fourth of
the risk interval in each case. As the prior probability for the sub-
marine being present increases, the point of indifference, 0.0. moves
toward the upper limit for the particular interval. This is as expected
The amount of movement is greater for small values of P(Eg ).
The prior conditions for graph A assume that 15 submarines are in
the area of search. For graph B this equates to an assumption of 112
submarines in the area. For graph C this number would be 285.
A realistic view of the number of enemy submarines that would be
expected in a given search area will limit the a priori probabilities
to those less than 0.20. This will tend to reduce the sensitiveness in




In the previous analysis of the submarine contact incident it was
assumed that the ASW commander was faced with a single contact decision
problem at a specific point during the incident. This will not be the
case in general.
As the tactical situation progresses each contact gained by a sen-
sor, and each period where contact is not made on the potential target,
creates an interim decision point. In the illustrative situation the
arrival of the helicopters in the contact area prior to the arrival of
the destroyers, is an example of one such decision point.
A decision analysis made at this point in the incident would have
provided a risk-value of 61.4, with maximum and minimum values of 62.6
and 45.9. The indication here would have been for a decision to drop
the contact at this point.
However j if no other contact incidents were in progress, or if it
were possible to pursue this contact with a minimum loss of vehicle
utilization, it might be profitable to delay an action decision until
additional information were obtained.
If additional incidents had been in progress at the time of the ini-
tial contact referred to in the illustration, a comparative analysis of
risk-values for each incident would have been in order. Such a compari-
son provides a method of evaluating the cost of obtaining additional
information for any one contact incident.
This type of analysis permits the ASW commander to utilize his
available forces most effectively.
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8. Tactical Use of the Bayesian Decision Process.
The sea-going officer will view the foregoing analytical procedures
with some trepidation. The mathematical methods are somewhat cumbersome
and involved, or at best impractical for tactical use.
It might be suggested that a computer program be developed for the
shipboard Navy Tactical Data System which would accomplish the required
mathematical manipulations and display the results. This would be in
keeping with the command and control functions for which this type com-
puter system was developed. However, the present meagerness of statis-
tical data, coupled with the nonavailability of NTDS type computers
for ASW use, postpones a payoff for such a proposal to the distant
future.
A relatively simple method which would accomplish the same task
could be made available to ASW forces at the present time. The avail-
able statistical data for initial detection and contact confirmation
could be reduced to graphic form. This would provide a means for deter-
mining the necessary contact probabilities. Elementary nomographs for
computing expected values also could be made available.
The graphs at the end of this section are examples of the type of
graphs suggested. These samples were developed from the hypothetical
data used in the previous submarine contact illustration.
Figure 1 would be used for the initial contact. Figures 2 through
7 would provide sequential probabilities as the interaction developed.
Figures 8 through 11 are examples of nomographs for computing expected
values.
The probability graphs contain three curves. The solid line
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represents statistical results for the exercise conditions stated in
the chart. The broken lines, labeled (+) and (-), provide a method of
increasing or decreasing the solid-line probabilities by a factor of
0.05. This permits the decision-maker to modify the historical data on
the basis of current environmental conditions.
The a posteriori probability obtained from one graph is used as
the a priori probability for evaluating the information factor next in
sequence.
This type of graphical presentation, based on stored exercise sta-
tistics, can be produced with the use of particular auxiliary equipments
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